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OVERDUE JUSTICE: PEOPLE V. VALENZUELA 
AND THE PATH TOWARD GANG 
PROSECUTION REFORM 
Ryan Nelson* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, otherwise 
known as the STEP Act (the “Act”), became law in 1988 in response 
to the public safety concerns surrounding rising gang violence, 
especially in Southern California.1 At first, it was designed to provide 
prosecutors with an additional tool to target the leaders of large gangs 
with extensive backgrounds in homicide and narcotics trafficking.2 
But the STEP Act succumbed to the “tough on crime” era that 
came soon after its passage. Eventually, its original intent was lost, 
and the Act sprawled ever outward, aided by the California 
legislature,3 the electorate,4 and a particularly punitive form of judicial 
activism.5 
This Comment will focus on that activism. It argues that even 
with a newly sympathetic California Supreme Court, the STEP Act 
has so far strayed from its original intent that reform requires a new 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.S., Environmental 
Sciences, University of California, Los Angeles. I would like to thank Professor Paul Hayden for 
his support and feedback on this Comment. I would like to thank the staff and editors of the Loyola 
of Los Angeles Law Review, especially Kelly Larocque and Jacob Nielson, for ensuring it was fit 
to print. And I would like to thank my parents and friends for sacrificing their time to read it and 
for their unending support.  
 1. J. Franklin Sigal, Comment, Out of Step: When the California Street Terrorism 
Enforcement and Prevention Act Stumbles into Penal Code Limits, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 
1, 3 (2007). 
 2. Martin Baker, Stuck in the Thicket: Struggling with Interpretation and Application of 
California’s Anti-Gang STEP Act, 11 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 101, 115 (2006). 
 3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22 (West 1988) (amended 1993, 2000, 2002, 2006, 2007, 
2010, 2011, 2014, 2017, 2018). 
 4. Baker, supra note 2, at 115 (explaining that the electorate expanded the reach of the STEP 
Act through Proposition 21 in the year 2000). 
 5. See People v. Sengpadychith, 27 P.3d 739, 744 (Cal. 2001); People v. Castenada, 3 P.3d 
278, 279 (Cal. 2000); People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 719 (Cal. 1996), abrogated on other 
grounds by People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320 (Cal. 2016). 
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legislative or electoral answer. Bringing justice to those affected by 
gang violence while still protecting the rights of the accused may 
require some judicial discretion; but, as will be shown, the labyrinth 
of California case law surrounding the STEP Act has made it 
untenable in its current form. Given the urgency of the matters 
surrounding the law, fixing the STEP Act can no longer be left up to 
judges and requires significant statutory reform. 
The Comment will proceed as follows: first, it will illustrate how 
the STEP Act works. Next, it will explore how a conservative 
California Supreme Court, working in the tough-on-crime era of the 
Act’s early years, expanded the Act’s reach beyond the original 
legislative intent. Third, it will examine the structural issues with the 
Act’s enforcement and the shifting attitudes toward criminal justice 
reform that countered the Act’s expansion. And finally, it will examine 
People v. Valenzuela,6 how this decision is distinguishable from prior 
California Supreme Court jurisprudence, and what that means for the 
Act’s future. 
II.  THE ACT 
The STEP Act provides prosecutors with two tools to aid in their 
fight against criminal street gangs: a stand-alone provision 
criminalizing a person’s active participation in a gang7 and a 
sentencing enhancement targeted at persons who commit crimes “for 
the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal 
street gang.”8 
A.  Subsection 186.22(a) 
Subsection 186.22(a) is the stand-alone component of the Act.9 It 
reads, in pertinent part, “Any person who actively participates in any 
criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in, or 
have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully 
promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by 
members of that gang, shall be punished . . . .”10 
 
 6. 441 P.3d 896 (Cal. 2019). 
 7. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (West 2014). 
 8. Id. § 186.22(b)(1). 
 9. See id. § 186.22(a). 
 10. Id. 
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The Act defines “criminal street gang” and “pattern of criminal 
gang activity” as well.11 In subsection 186.22(e), the statute lists 
thirty-three eligible crimes.12 Under the STEP Act, a “criminal street 
gang” is “any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or 
more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary 
activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts”13 listed 
in subsection 186.22(e).14 That association of people must also “[have] 
a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and [its] 
members [must] individually or collectively engage in, or have 
engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity.”15 
In order to have a “pattern of criminal gang activity,” the person 
charged under subsection 186.22(a) must know that group of three or 
more people committed, planned to commit, or attempted to commit 
any of those thirty-three crimes on two separate occasions within the 
past three years.16 
It is a maze of confusing statutory language. But the gist is: if a 
prosecutor wants to charge someone with participating in a street gang 
under subsection 186.22(a), the following must be proved: 
1. The defendant was part of a group of three or more persons; 
2. The group had a common identifying sign or symbol; 
3. The group committed, tried to commit, or conspired to 
commit most of the thirty-three crimes listed in 186.22(e), at 
least twice, on different occasions, over a three-year period; 
4. The defendant knew about these crimes; and 
5. The defendant then helped the group engage in further 
“felonious criminal conduct.”17 
As will be elaborated later in this Comment, interpretation of 
subsection 186.22(a) has proven difficult and is central to the decision 
in People v. Valenzuela.18 
B.  Subsection 186.22(b)(1) 
 Subsection 186.22(b)(1) reads in pertinent part: 
 
 11. Id. § 186.22(e)–(f). 
 12. See id. § 186.22(e). 
 13. Id. § 186.22(f). 
 14. Id. § 186.22(e)–(f). 
 15. Id. § 186.22(f). 
 16. Id. § 186.22(a), (e). 
 17. Id. § 186.22. 
 18. See People v. Valenzuela, 441 P.3d 896, 906 (Cal. 2019). 
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[A]ny person who is convicted of a felony committed for the 
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any 
criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, 
further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members, 
shall, upon conviction of that felony, in addition and 
consecutive to the punishment prescribed for the felony or 
attempted felony of which he or she has been convicted, be 
[additionally] punished.19  
This subsection is an enhancement; it adds additional punishment onto 
an established felony. 
Subsection 186.22(b)(1) has also been subject to uneven 
jurisprudence.20 While this Comment focuses its analysis specifically 
on subsection 186.22(a)—as it was at issue in Valenzuela—
jurisprudence surrounding subsection 186.22(b)(1) remains complex 
and unduly punitive. Some exploration of that will be discussed below. 
III.  THE EXPANSION 
There is no dispute that a crime wave gripped California in the 
1980s.21 The decade saw a historic peak of property crimes and a 
consistently high rate of violent crimes.22 In a sign of the times, voters 
ousted three California Supreme Court justices in the 1986 election, 
all of whom had been squarely on the liberal end of the spectrum when 
it came to criminal justice reform.23 The campaign against the justices 
cited the justices’ lack of affection for the death penalty as a key reason 
to vote them out.24 Following the election, Governor George 
Deukmejian installed three new justices who would soon swing the 
court to the right on nearly all matters in the state, including criminal 
justice reform.25 
Conventional thinking at the time linked much of the increase in 
crime to violent street gangs—and the media played a huge role in 
 
 19. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(b)(1) (West 2014). 
 20. See Martin Baker, Crips and Nuns: Defining Gang-Related Crime in California Under the 
Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 891, 897 (2009). 
 21. See Magnus Lofstrom & Brandon Martin, Crime Trends in California, PUB. POL’Y INST. 
CAL. (Oct. 2018), https://www.ppic.org/publication/crime-trends-in-california. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Claire Machado, Did the Politicalization of the Supreme Court Start in California?, 
BERKELEY POL. REV. (Jan. 28, 2019), https://bpr.berkeley.edu/2019/01/28/did-the-politicalization-
of-the-supreme-court-start-in-california. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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defining that narrative. In February of 1988, the New York Times 
declared Los Angeles “a simmering ethnic stew pot,” populated by 
“black gangs” that held “disdain for human life.”26 In April of the same 
year, the Washington Post announced the results of a “strike force” 
that tore through Los Angeles’s “crime ridden neighborhoods.”27 The 
Los Angeles Times, in June of 1988, documented a raid that netted 750 
gang members and 1,524 total arrests.28 Then-Mayor Tom Bradley 
promised to take back the streets of the City of the Angels from 
“terrorists.”29 
Then, in an emergency session in September of 1988, the 
California legislature declared, “[T]he state of California is in a state 
of crisis . . . .”30 From that hysteria the STEP Act was born. 
But even amidst one of the worst crime waves in the state’s 
history, the California legislature took great pains to ensure 
prosecutions under the Act were difficult “except in the most egregious 
cases.”31 As an example, the original STEP Act required that the 
defendant charged as a member of a gang be fully aware the gang had 
committed two of the statutorily defined “serious crimes” prior to the 
conduct at issue.32 In 1988, there were all of seven “serious” crimes: 
“assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce 
great bodily injury; robbery; homicide or manslaughter; sale, 
manufacture, and possession for sale of narcotics; shooting at an 
inhabited dwelling or occupied vehicle; arson; and witness and victim 
intimidation.”33 And the original sponsor of the STEP Act concluded 
those seven “extremely serious” crimes were “typical of street 
gangs.”34 
 
 26. Robert Reinhold, Gang Violence Shocks Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 8, 1988), at A10, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/08/us/gang-violence-shocks-los-angeles.html. 
 27. Jay Matthews, More than 600 Arrested in Anti-Gang Sweep by Los Angeles Police, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 10, 1988), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/04/10/more-than-
600-arrested-in-anti-gang-sweep-by-los-angeles-police/ad53910b-81ba-4c32-a512-
7f9ed9458056. 
 28. Bettina Boxall, 750 Gang Members Arrested in 2-Night Sweeps, L.A. TIMES (June 13, 
1988, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1988-06-13-me-3206-story.html. 
 29. Eric Malnic & Mark Arax, 1,000 Officers Stage Assault Against Violent Youth Gangs, 
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 9, 1988, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1988-06-13-me-
3206-story.html. 
 30. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 (West 2019). 
 31. Baker, supra note 2, at 114 (quoting S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BILL ANALYSIS: AB 
2013, Record No. 29069, 1987–88 Reg. Sess., at 7 (Cal. 1988)). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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The sponsors also designed the Act to provide extra punishment 
if, and only if, the prosecution could prove the affiliated gang 
committed at least two serious crimes prior to the defendant being 
charged under the STEP Act.35 Therefore, a defendant should have 
only received an enhancement or a conviction under the STEP Act 
after prosecutors proved the gang had committed, and the defendant 
knew of, two of those defined “serious” criminal acts.36 The California 
legislature took pains to indicate the STEP Act was a tool to be used 
cautiously by prosecutors to take down serious criminals—loose 
associations of neighborhood kids who tagged buildings with their 
initials were, by and large, supposed to be excluded from the STEP 
Act’s purview.37 
IV.  THE EXPLOSION: GARDELEY, CASTENADA, AND SENGPADYCHITH 
The modesty would not last. Three cases in particular—People v. 
Gardeley,38 People v. Castenada,39 and People v. Sengpadychith40—
interpreted several important parts of the STEP Act in a broader 
manner than intended. These will be handled in order. 
A.  People v. Gardeley 
In 1996, the newly-conservative California Supreme Court had 
its first opportunity to interpret the STEP Act in People v. Gardeley.41 
Gardeley was decided in the middle of the “tough on crime era.” Just 
two years prior, California legislature passed its infamous “three 
strikes law.”42 At the same time, its federal counterpart had similarly 
passed its own “tough on crime” bill.43 Throughout the 1990s, the 
STEP Act was continuously revised and expanded—and the list of 
 
 35. Id. at 114–15. 
 36. Id. at 115. 
 37. Id. 
 38. 927 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 
320 (Cal. 2016). 
 39. 3 P.3d 278 (Cal. 2000). 
 40. 27 P.3d 739 (Cal. 2001). 
 41. See Gardeley, 927 P.2d at 715 (“At issue in this case are certain provisions of the Street 
Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, also known as the STEP Act, enacted by the 
Legislature in 1988.”). 
 42. See California’s Three Strikes Sentencing Law, CAL. CTS., 
https://www.courts.ca.gov/20142.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2019). 
 43. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 1808 
(1994). 
(11) 53.2_NELSON (DO NOT DELETE) 6/5/2020  1:16 PM 
2020] OVERDUE JUSTICE: PEOPLE V. VALENZUELA 507 
“serious” crimes ballooned from seven to thirty-three.44 The year 1996 
was also the year of the “super predator”—the entirely made up, now 
thoroughly discredited idea that group of evil crime-prone youths 
would run wild in the streets45—an idea Hillary Clinton parroted in a 
now infamous speech.46 
It is no surprise then that in its first review of the STEP Act, the 
California Supreme Court lowered the burden for prosecutors. 
Previously, defendants were supposed to know of two serious 
crimes—from a list of seven—that their counterparts had engaged in.47 
Only after establishing knowledge of those two serious crimes could 
the charges be enhanced.48 
The Gardeley court reduced this burden by allowing prosecutors 
to use the current charges levied against a defendant and his 
accomplices to prove that knowledge.49 After Gardeley, if a defendant 
knew of one previous incident, but was charged with two of the serious 
crimes on the list found in the statute, one of those two could serve as 
the foundation for meeting the knowledge requirement.50 The court 
also declared the knowledge could be of “uncharged,” and therefore 
unproven, crimes.51 
Worse still, the California Supreme Court did so by hiding behind 
a veneer of straight-faced legislative intent. The court noted prior 
precedent required them to “construe penal laws as favorably to 
criminal defendants as reasonably permitted.”52 But the court 
demurred on that, arguing that policy only arises when the language 
of the statute “is susceptible of two constructions.”53 The court instead 
contended there was “no need for construction” as the plain-faced text 
 
 44. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(e) (West 2014). 
 45. John DiLulio, The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD (Nov. 27, 1995, 
12:00 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/the-coming-of-the-super-
predators. 
 46. Ronda Lee, Why Hillary’s Super-Predator Comment Matters, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Apr. 11, 2016, 01:37 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/hillarys-superpredator-
comment_b_9655052. 
 47. See Baker, supra note 2, at 114–15. 
 48. See id. 
 49. People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 726 (Cal. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by People 
v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320 (Cal. 2016). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 727; see Baker, supra note 2, at 115–16 (discussing how Gardeley lowered the 
burden on prosecutors). 
 52. Gardeley, 927 P.2d at 724 (citing People v. Overstreet, 726 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Cal. 1986)). 
 53. Id. (quoting Overstreet, 726 P.2d at 1290). 
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of the STEP Act sufficiently illustrated the “legislative intent” of the 
statute.54 As such, the court drew its conclusion in Gardeley based 
solely on the text of the Act.55 
Given that Gardeley was a case of first impression, arguably 
plenty of room existed for “two constructions” of any number of the 
examined terms in the statute.56 The Gardeley court looked at a 
number of subsections of the STEP Act: 186.22(b)(1), 186.22(e), and 
186.22(f).57 Subsection 186.22(f) defines criminal street gangs as an 
“ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, 
whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the 
commission of one or more of the criminal acts,” in addition to 
“having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol.”58 
Interpretive issues abound—what defines a “primary activity” of a 
group? What is a common name or symbol? Who decides how 
common it is? In addition, subsection 186.22(b)(1) looks at one’s 
“association” with a gang—what defines an association?59 
This is not to say the Gardeley court should have, or even could 
have, answered these questions. But given that it was a case of first 
impression, the cautious thing to do would have been to explore the 
legislative intent further. Instead, the court chose not to, claiming that 
the legislative intent was obvious, and reached an erroneous decision 
that ultimately harmed criminal defendants. 
B.  People v. Castenada 
People v. Castenada was the next decision that reduced the 
burden on the prosecution. Castenada came on the heels of 
Proposition 21.60 Passed in March of 2000, Proposition 21 came in the 
wake of the “super-predator” theory and not only enhanced criminal 
punishment under the STEP Act but also enhanced juvenile 
punishment throughout the state of California.61 
 
 54. Id. at 723. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 724 (quoting Overstreet, 726 P.2d at 1290). 
 57. Id. at 720. 
 58. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(f) (West 2014). 
 59. Id. § 186.22(b)(1). 
 60. See People v. Castenada, 3 P.3d 278, 279–80 (Cal. 2000). 
 61. Lizabeth N. De Vries, Comment, Guilt by Association: Proposition 21’s Gang Conspiracy 
Law Will Increase Youth Violence in California, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 191, 192 (2002). 
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Castenada also lowered the burden for the prosecution. 
Previously, the First District Court of Appeal, in People v. Green,62 
issued the controlling law for how “active” a gang member needs to 
be to qualify for a stand-alone conviction under the STEP Act.63 Green 
required the prosecution to prove a defendant “devot[ed] . . . a 
substantial part of [their] time and efforts” to the street gang.64 The 
defendant in Castenada argued that the Green decision effectively 
required the prosecution to show that a defendant held a leadership 
position in the gang.65 
The high court disagreed, striking both of those standards, and 
replacing it with a lower burden: participation need be only more than 
“nominal or passive.”66 
C.  People v. Sengpadychith 
The interpretation issues continued. In 2001, the California 
Supreme Court decided People v. Sengpadychith.67 There, the court 
grappled with how to define “primary activities” as it related to 
subsection 186.22(e) of the STEP Act.68 It first offered that “primary 
activity” be defined by requiring criminal conduct be the “principal” 
occupation of the group.69 It also contended “consistent[] and 
repeated[] . . . criminal activity” may establish criminal conduct as the 
group’s “primary activity.”70 How could a prosecutor prove consistent 
and repeated criminal activity? The court offered that potentially a 
gang police officer could testify as an expert witness—an issue that 
will become more apparent later.71 
But there is another issue at play here. At the beginning of the 
opinion, the court acknowledged its interpretation of subsections 
186.22(e) and (f) again—even though in Gardeley, the court felt it 
 
 62. 278 Cal. Rptr. 140 (Ct. App. 1991), abrogated by People v. Castenada, 3 P.3d 278 (Cal. 
2000). 
 63. Id. at 146; see also Castenada, 3 P.3d at 281 (acknowledging Green). 
 64. Green, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 146. 
 65. People v. Castenada, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 200, 202 (Ct. App. 1998), aff’d, People v. 
Castenada, 3 P.3d 278 (Cal. 2000).  
 66. Castenada, 3 P.3d at 284–85; see also Baker, supra note 2, at 109 (discussing the lowering 
of the burden in Castenada). 
 67. See People v. Sengpadychith, 27 P.3d 739, 741 (Cal. 2001). 
 68. Id. at 744. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 743 (citing People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 722 (Cal. 1996), abrogated on other 
grounds by People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320 (Cal. 2016)). 
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required no additional materials to help interpret these subsections 
because the legislative intent was apparent enough on the face of the 
subsections.72 And, recall, that the Gardeley court specifically 
eschewed precedent that would have required them to interpret the 
STEP Act in the way most favorable to the criminal defendant because 
the court felt the statute was easily understandable.73 
But instead of acknowledging the mistake and acting more 
cautiously, the California Supreme Court continued to operate in a 
way that expanded the rights of the prosecutor over the accused. In 
Sengpadychith, it did so again by focusing on the quantity of crimes 
as opposed to the quality of crimes.74 
V.  RESISTANCE GROWS 
It is no surprise that a conservative California Supreme Court 
expanded the prosecution’s reach during the “tough on crime” era. 
However, the foundation of the counter-revolution bubbled 
underneath the general consensus on crime and punishment. 
Sociological researchers continued to mount evidence that indicated 
crime and gang-ridden areas did not need more police officers; they 
needed more financial support, more investment, and more social 
resources.75 In 1999, researchers from University of California, Los 
Angeles published a study examining the relationship between 
socioeconomic factors and gang violence.76 The study concluded that 
low-income and lack of employment opportunities in communities 
directly correlated with gang violence.77 
Entering the new millennium, crime rates continued to drop in 
California.78 Nevertheless, the state continued to lock up more 
people.79 In the trenches, prosecutors and defense attorneys grappled 
 
 72. Id.at 741–42. 
 73. See Gardeley, 927 P.2d at 723 (Cal. 1996). 
 74. Sengpadychith, 27 P.3d at 744; see also Baker, supra note 2, at 116–17 (discussing the 
problem with the court’s expansive definition of “primary activity”). 
 75. Chase Sackett, Neighborhoods and Violent Crime, DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV. OFF. 
POL’Y DEV. & RES. (2016), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/em/summer16/ 
highlight2.html. 
 76. See Demetrios N. Kyriacou et al., The Relationship Between Socioeconomic Factors and 
Gang Violence in the City of Los Angeles, 46 J. TRAUMA 334, 334 (1999). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Lofstrom & Martin, supra note 21. 
 79. DEP’T. JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL., NCJ 188207, PRISONERS IN 2000 1, 4 (2001) 
(explaining that by the year 2000, California had the most occupied prisons in the country with 
inmate percentage growth of 70.4 percent). 
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with an inconsistent and punitive judicial system when it came to gang 
members. And the arbitrary nature of gang prosecutions—as well their 
susceptibility to common human error—started making their ever-
growing punishments harder and harder to justify. 
Examining the process to prove a gang enhancement 
demonstrates how, at every turn, ample room for human error exists. 
It starts with the police identifying who is in a gang. For example, 
according to the City of San Diego, there are nine criteria their officers 
use in identifying potential gang members; of those nine, some include 
frequenting gang areas and “be[ing] identified as a gang member by 
an untested informant.”80 
This expansive police discretion causes problems at the source. 
Identified gang members are often added to a statewide database, 
CalGang, enabling police to track an identified person’s movement 
throughout the state.81 However, people often find themselves 
incorrectly tagged as a gang member. Those who just happen to live 
in gang territory or just happen to know someone in a gang are 
frequently misidentified as gang members.82 Even gang 
interventionists dedicated to preventing gang violence have been 
identified as gang members by the database.83 In 2016, a state audit 
found that “[l]aw enforcement agencies have failed to ensure that 
CalGang records are added, removed, and shared in a way that 
maintains the accuracy of the system and safeguards individuals’ 
rights.”84 The lax maintenance of the database came to its logical 
conclusion in February of 2020, when the California attorney general 
announced he would investigate the Los Angeles Police Department 
after it was revealed that twenty officers had allegedly falsified 
CalGang records.85 
 
 80. See Memorandum from the San Diego Police Dep’t on Frequently Asked Questions 
Regarding Identifying Gangs and Gang Members, https://www.sandiego.gov/sites/default/files/ 
legacy/police/pdf/gangfaq.pdf. 
 81. See CAL. ST. AUDITOR, REP. 2015-130, CALGANG CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM  1 
(2016), https://auditor.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2015-130.pdf. 
 82. See Ali Winston, You May Be in California’s Gang Database and Not Even Know It, 
REVEAL (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.revealnews.org/article/you-may-be-in-californias-gang-
database-and-not-even-know-it/. 
 83. See Katie Flaherty, He’s a Gang Intervention Worker. But California Police Call Him a 
Gang Member, NBC NEWS (Aug. 18, 2019, 8:59 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/he-s-gang-intervention-worker-california-police-call-him-gang-n1043666. 
 84. CAL. ST. AUDITOR, supra note 81, at 36. 
 85.  Leila Miller & Anita Chabria, California Attorney General to Investigate LAPD Gang-
Framing Scandal, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2020 1:57 PM), 
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In the trenches, public defenders and prosecutors acknowledged 
the same years before any published audit. In interviews from 2009, 
public defenders pointed out several instances in which someone 
accused of being in a gang was just from a neighborhood where it was 
nearly impossible not to interact with gangs.86 In one example, the 
childhood nickname of an unaffiliated person in the neighborhood 
became that person’s presumed gang moniker because the police 
assumed the nickname was gang related.87 District attorneys similarly 
admitted that gang enhancements could be arbitrarily applied.88 
Further, prosecutors explained that harsher penalties—added well 
after the bill passed into law89—incentivized adding gang 
enhancements as it made the proving the enhancements more worth 
the trouble.90 
These issues routinely spill over into court, where prosecutors are 
permitted to introduce highly prejudicial, and oftentimes highly 
speculative, gang affiliations and the testimony of expert “gang 
cops.”91 
All of this is to say that the path to a conviction under the STEP 
Act remains uniquely fraught with opportunities for error. Every step 
of the way, miscommunications, misunderstandings, socioeconomic 
factors, and potentially flat out lies contribute to an overly-punitive 
system. 
A.  People v. Albillar 
Yet, in the face of growing criticism, judicial interpretation of the 
law shifted only slightly. At the highest level, the case law remained 
calcified until People v. Albillar92 in 2010. There, the California 




 86. Erin Y. Yoshino, California’s Criminal Gang Enhancements: Lessons from Interviews 
with Practitioners, 18 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 117, 127 (2008). 
 87. Id. at 128–29. 
 88. Id. at 133. 
 89. See Baker, supra note 2, at 105; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(b)(1)(A)–(C) (West 
2014) (explaining mandatory minimums in enhancements). 
 90. See Yoshino, supra note 86, at 133. 
 91. Id. at 134; see also People v. Hernandez, 94 P.3d 1080, 1085–89 (Cal. 2004) (permitting 
the use of bifurcation in trials for criminal prosecutions and enhancements, but allowing gang 
evidence as a form of character evidence that can be used even in trials not involving gang 
membership). 
 92. 244 P.3d 1062 (Cal. 2010). 
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subsection 186.22(b)(1) and considered whether a crime could be 
committed by a group of gang members that were not acting for the 
benefit of the gang.93 
The California Supreme Court acknowledged the possibility that 
a group of gang members may embark on a “frolic and detour” from 
their association as gang members to commit a crime.94 The court even 
offered that the defense may negate any finding of an enhancement 
under the STEP Act.95 But the acknowledgement was a cautious one—
the court declared the defendants in Albillar were not on a “frolic and 
detour.”96 Nevertheless, Albillar marked the first instance in decades 
that the California Supreme Court provided criminal defendants a leg 
to stand on, no matter how weak. After decades of throwing the book 
at defendants, Albillar represented a potential softening of the punitive 
judicial activism of old. 
But a turning point had not come just yet. While that “frolic and 
detour” language created a moment of inspiration, it was ultimately 
futile. Scholars published thoughts on potential new legal standards 
for proving gang enhancements97 and several defense attorneys 
utilized the argument on federal habeas corpus petitions.98 But as of 
this writing, the defense has never been successful. 
B.  Post Albillar 
In the decade following Albillar, the dam on criminal justice 
reform broke and a number of judicial, legislative, and electoral 
reforms took hold in California. First came Brown v. Plata,99 handed 
down by the United States Supreme Court in 2011, which forced 
California to deal with its over-incarceration habit. Following Plata, 
the California legislature passed AB 109—better known as 
“realignment”100—which helped stem the tide by providing local 
 
 93. Id. at 1073. 
 94. Id. at 1072. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1072–73. 
 97. See Baker, supra note 20, at 897. 
 98. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Lewis, No. 1:11-cv-01811-JLT, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50638, at 
*17 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2014) (utilizing the “frolic and detour” defense but ultimately having the 
enhancements upheld). 
 99. 563 U.S. 493 (2011). 
 100. See CAL. LEGIS., AB 109, 2011–2012, Reg. Sess. (2011). 
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governments with more power to determine sentencing;101 in 2014, 
Proposition 47 passed, which re-classified several non-violent and 
drug felonies as misdemeanors.102 Then, in 2016, Californians passed 
Proposition 57, which opened up the possibility of parole for a wide 
population of non-violent offenders who had previously been 
ineligible.103 In 2017, a bill passed reforming CalGang.104 In 2018, the 
California legislature passed a number of criminal justice reform 
bills—including the end of cash bail, an increase in judicial discretion 
over sentencing, and the elimination of felony murder.105 But even 
during a decade of change, the California legislature barely touched 
the STEP Act, choosing instead to tweak the bill in non-consequential 
ways.106 
The most consequential change for those charged with gang 
enhancements was the shift in the composition of the California 
Supreme Court after Albillar. Between 2011 and 2019, five new 
justices were appointed to the California Supreme Court.107 
Far from the death-penalty-loving court of old, the new justices 
appeared far more reform-oriented. Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye led 
the cash-bail reform effort.108 Justice Florentino-Cuéllar spent time in 
the Obama administration working on a host of legislation.109 Justice 
Liu wrote a law review article arguing for the constitutional right to 
welfare.110 Justice Groban, the most recent addition to the court, 
 
 101. Magnus Lofstrom & Brandon Martin, Public Safety Realignment: Impacts So Far, PUB. 
POL’Y INST. CAL. (Sept. 2015), https://www.ppic.org/publication/public-safety-realignment-
impacts-so-far/. 
 102. Proposition 47: The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, CAL. CTS., 
https://www.courts.ca.gov/prop47.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2019). 
 103. The Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS & 
REHABILITATION, https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/proposition57/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2019). 
 104. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.34 (West 2018). 
 105. California Governor Signs Many Criminal Justice Changes into Law, S. CAL. DEF. BLOG 
(Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.southerncaliforniadefenseblog.com/2018/11/california-governor-
signs-many-criminal-justice-changes-into-law.html. 
 106. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22 (Deering 2007). 
 107. Scott Shafer, Brown’s Longest-Lasting Legacy: Judges, KQED (Dec. 28, 2018), 
https://www.kqed.org/news/11714131/browns-longest-lasting-legacy-judges. 
 108. Marisa Lagos, California Chief Justice: Bail Reform Process ‘Unassailable’, KQED 
(Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.kqed.org/news/11690832/california-chief-justice-bail-reform-
process-unassailable. 
 109. See Associate Justice Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, CAL. CTS., 
https://www.courts.ca.gov/28724.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2019). 
 110. See Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 203 
(2008). 
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worked on a number of policies for Governor Jerry Brown.111 These 
changes meant the people deciding Valenzuela differed significantly 
from those deciding Gardeley, and even Albillar. 
VI.  VALENZUELA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
A.  The Road to Valenzuela 
That will take us, momentarily, to Valenzuela. But before 
discussion of that case, some important foundation must be laid. 
Valenzuela reconciled three key developments in California 
jurisprudence: In re Estrada,112 Proposition 47, and People v. 
Buycks.113 
In re Estrada, decided in 1965, created the modern rule 
concerning the retroactivity of statutes reducing punishments for 
certain crimes.114 In Estrada, the court answered a fundamental 
question: when a statute is amended before a defendant’s case closes, 
does the statute at the time of the crime or the statute at the time of the 
case’s appeal control?115 Estrada definitively declared that defendants 
were entitled to the “ameliorating benefits” of the amendment, 
provided the case has not closed.116 
Estrada rose to prominence again in 2014 when the California 
electorate passed Proposition 47.117 Proposition 47 amended the 
California Penal Code and reduced a number of felonies to 
misdemeanors.118 Proposition 47 expressly provided a mechanism for 
defendants to apply for re-sentencing and felony-to-misdemeanor 
reduction.119 What Proposition 47 did not address, however, was what 
would become of specific enhancements that required felony 
convictions. 
 
 111. Bob Egelko, Jerry Brown’s Legacy: Diversifying the Judicial Bench, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 3, 
2019, 07:28 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/Jerry-Brown-s-legacy-diversifying-
the-judicial-13507344.php. 
 112. 408 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1965). 
 113. 422 P.3d 531 (Cal. 2018). 
 114. In re Estrada, 408 P.2d at 950. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 951 (illustrating that a case pending appeal is not considered closed). 
 117. See Proposition 47: The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, supra note 102; see also 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18(b) (West 2019). The petitioner in Valenzuela was resentenced under 
California Penal Code section 1170.18(b), based on the changes enacted by Proposition 47.  People 
v. Valenzuela, 441 P.3d 896, 899 (Cal. 2019)). 
 118. See Proposition 47: The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, supra note 102. 
 119. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18(b). 
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Enter 2018’s Buycks. There, three defendants successfully 
reduced their felonies to misdemeanors via the mechanisms created by 
Proposition 47.120 At play in Buycks were three separate 
enhancements:121 California Penal Code section 667.5, part of 
California’s infamous “three strikes” law;122 California Penal Code 
subsection 12022.1(b), which added two extra years for additional 
felonies committed while on bail;123 and California Penal Code section 
1320.5, which declared, “Every person who is charged with or 
convicted of the commission of a felony, who is released from custody 
on bail, and who in order to evade the process of the court willfully 
fails to appear as required, is guilty of a felony.”124 
The Buycks court dismissed the enhancements brought under 
section 667.5 and subsection 12011.1(b), while upholding the 
enhancement brought under section 1320.5.125 The key distinction laid 
in “plain reading” text of the statute—section 1320.5 only required a 
felony charge whereas the other two required felony convictions.126 
Because Proposition 47 reduced the necessary felony convictions to 
misdemeanors, the court determined the enhancements lacked a 
critical element and dismissed them.127 
B.  People v. Valenzuela 
Then, People v. Valenzuela arrived. There, a young defendant 
stole a $200 bicycle.128 The jury convicted the defendant on two 
grounds: grand theft and the STEP Act.129 While the case was on 
appeal, Proposition 47 passed, and the defendant successfully 
petitioned to reduce his grand theft felony to a misdemeanor.130 
This brought the California Supreme Court to a crucial question: 
with the felony charge no longer present, could the conviction under 
the STEP Act stand? The case turned on the phrasing of a key 
requirement in the statute: the defendant must assist in “any felonious 
 
 120. People v. Buycks, 422 P.3d 531, 535 (Cal. 2018). 
 121. Id. at 536–37. 
 122. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5 (West 2019). 
 123. Id. § 12022.1 (West Supp. 2019). 
 124. Id. § 1320.5 (West 2014) (emphasis added). 
 125. Buycks, 422 P.3d at 547–49. 
 126. Id. at 548. 
 127. Id. at 547–49. 
 128. People v. Valenzuela, 441 P.3d 896, 899 (Cal. 2019). 
 129. Id.; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22 (West 2014). 
 130. Valenzuela, 441 P.3d at 899–900. 
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criminal conduct by members of that gang.”131 The State argued the 
term “conduct” did not require that the defendant be convicted of a 
felony.132 It also stressed that the legal classification of the crime at 
the time it was committed controlled the outcome of the sentencing.133 
The Valenzuela court disagreed. The court determined that the 
stand-alone conviction under the STEP Act required the “conduct” to 
be felonious—and since the theft was now a misdemeanor, it was by 
definition no longer felonious.134 The court likened the felony 
conviction requirement of the Buycks statutes to the felonious conduct 
requirement of the STEP Act; to the court, these were one and the 
same requirement.135 Since the defendant’s theft was reduced to a 
misdemeanor and, by definition, was no longer felonious, the STEP 
Act conviction lacked a critical element.136 
The court added another wrinkle: if a prosecutor wanted to argue 
that the conduct furthered a felony committed by the gang, even if the 
defendant’s actions themselves were only worthy of a misdemeanor, 
then the prosecutor would have to draw the causal link between the 
misdemeanor and a specific, identified felony committed by the 
gang.137 In effect, the prosecution’s burden would soon become two-
fold: to not only prove a misdemeanor beyond a reasonable doubt, but 
to prove that misdemeanor assisted in a specific felony committed by 
other gang members.138 
The court also declared that Estrada’s ameliorative effects 
trumped the State’s second argument.139 In doing so, the court noted 
that “no indicia of legislative intent” concerning the STEP Act 
indicated a felony was “fixed for all time when the crime takes 
place.”140 As such, Estrada controlled, and the defendant deserved the 
precedent’s ameliorative effects.141 
The dissenting opinions provide fuller context for why 
Valenzuela is distinguishable from other California Supreme Court 
 
 131. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (emphasis added). 
 132. Valenzuela, 441 P.3d at 904. 
 133. Id. at 904–05. 
 134. Id. at 904. 
 135. Id. at 905. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 904 n.5. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 905. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
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decisions regarding gang enhancements. Justice Corrigan took the 
opposite stance of the majority. Instead of equating felonious conduct 
to a felony conviction, Justice Corrigan argued that the defendant’s 
actions “promot[ed]” the defendant’s gang—a standard Justice 
Corrigan felt satisfied the requirement under the STEP Act for a stand-
alone conviction, even if the crime that promoted the gang was itself 
reduced to a misdemeanor.142 In addition, she pointed out that 
Proposition 47 was not specifically designed to address crimes under 
the STEP Act and that doing so expanded the reach of the Proposition 
in a “random and haphazard” way.143 
Justice Kruger took issue with the court’s use of Estrada in her 
dissenting opinion.144 She noted that at no point did the defense raise 
an Estrada defense.145 In fact, she pointed out, the defendant 
“affirmatively disclaimed reliance on this theory.”146  
C.  The Result 
It is not difficult to see the California Supreme Court of the 1990s 
agreeing with Justice Corrigan’s decision to distinguish Buycks. The 
same court that wrote Gardeley and Castenada would also likely find 
the Valenzuela court’s use of Estrada suspect. 
Yet, Valenzuela represents a modest step that will likely only 
assist a small number of defendants. At the end of the day, the STEP 
Act has been amended and historically interpreted in such a punitive 
way that modest, reform-oriented decisions like Valenzuela are likely 
the only real victories for criminal defendants. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
And that is only if there are victories at all. It is possible that 
California politics and judicial decisions remain firmly rooted in 
pursuit of criminal justice reform for the foreseeable future. Yet, that 
may change. A new current of punitive justice may once again spring 
up and take the judiciary with it. 
It also remains puzzling that, even with public defenders, 
prosecutors, and the state government acknowledging the systemic 
 
 142. Id. at 907 (Corrigan, J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. at 909. 
 144. Id. at 911 (Kruger, J., dissenting). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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issues in evaluating gang prosecutions, little action has been taken to 
address the issue. Instead, gang prosecutions remain in stasis—where 
small, modest steps like Valenzuela shift the tide only a little. 
Reform appears necessary. To start, California legislators would 
do well to bring the STEP Act back in line with its original intent. At 
the moment, it serves as a blunt instrument rather than a careful 
deterrent against serious gang members. 
There are a number of statutory reforms that could aid in that 
endeavor. To start, a statutorily defined explanation of “felonious 
criminal conduct” and a prohibition on using charged, but unproven, 
offenses as the basis for establishing gang prosecutions would aid 
significantly.147 
Next, the California legislature must reduce the number of 
“serious” crimes available. With thirty-three enumerated offenses, it 
is too easy for graffiti artists or raucous kids to be slammed with harsh 
penalties.148 
In addition, the Act should permit more judicial discretion in 
enhancement sentencing.149 Reducing mandatory punishments and 
providing judges with a spectrum of available sentences would ensure 
that the only worst offenders are punished with the maximum 
sentences. 
Finally, due to the extremely prejudicial nature of gang evidence, 
the California legislature should adopt language making the 
bifurcation of gang enhancements or gang prosecutions the norm. It 
can do so by clearly distinguishing the type of specific gang evidence 
that is always necessary, even in a “trial of guilt” that is otherwise not 
involved in a prosecution for gang activity.150 These modifications 
would scratch the surface of what reform could look like. 
The Valenzuela court did well by the defendant, and the likely 
small population of defendants situated similarly. But the fact that 
Valenzuela can so significantly depart from cases like Gardeley—less 
than twenty-five years later—speaks to the need for clarity on the 
matter. In order to bring about reform that helps those affected by gang 
violence while also respecting the rights of the criminally accused, a 
new, bottom-up framework is required. Judicial half-steps and tweaks 
 
 147. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (West 2014). 
 148. Id. § 186.22(e). 
 149. Id. § 186.22(b)(1)(A)–(C). 
 150. People v. Hernandez, 94 P.3d 1080, 1086 (Cal. 2004). 
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are no longer enough. Real reform requires new efforts on both the 
electoral and legislative fronts. 
 
